Abstract: The Biden Administration recognizes Taiwan as a self-governing entity of mainland China, a position otherwise known as the One China policy or “the status quo.” Several administrations have viewed this policy as offering stability in the Taiwan Strait, allowing both Taiwan and China to pursue independent political and socioeconomic transitions with limited cross-strait tensions. However, a growing body within the United States Congress has challenged the basis of the One China policy in response to increased competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which at times has prompted stark responses from the mainland.
Meanwhile, Taiwan is preparing for its January 2024 Presidential Elections, which have historically determined whether relations between Taiwan and China grow more hostile, or more cooperative, and by extension, the degree of U.S. involvement in the region. If Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which holds antagonistic views of cross-strait relations and which, under President Tsai, has formed Taiwan’s strongest relationship with the U.S., wins the 2024 election, the Biden Administration should consider revising its cross-strait policy. Based on China’s utilization of irregular warfare tactics, and major themes drawn from recent Congressional legislation, the Biden Administration should adjust its approach to maintaining the status quo and preventing a contingency over Taiwan by focusing on three areas: Determining its desired end-state with China, which is notably absent from the Administration’s security documents; combatting Chinese information operations; and increasing reliance on U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat hybrid problem sets.
Introduction
Taiwan’s presidential elections have set the tone for either a cooperative, or highly contentious relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and subsequently, the tone for United States cross-strait policy. On one hand, the Kuomintang (KMT) party views closer collaboration with the PRC as a way to protect Taiwan’s security, and opposes de jure Taiwan independence. When the presidential seat was held by a member of the KMT, cross-strait relations tended to bode well, especially on trade, and enabled the United States to maintain focus on other regions. On the other hand, DPP party leaders favor eventual independence, with some contending Taiwan is already a sovereign nation. The current DPP President, Tsai Ing-wen, holds this perspective, and views closer relations with the U.S. as the best guarantor of Taiwan’s security. In response, China’s President Xi Jinping has placed increased military and political pressure on Taipei, including conducting regular live-fire exercises near the island.
If the Biden Administration wants to maintain the status quo and manage regional escalations, it must calculate how Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential election will impact U.S. policy for cross-strait relations. Should the DPP secure another presidency and continue President Tsai’s deepening partnership with the U.S., China under President Xi Jinping might recalibrate its efforts to dissuade close relations, including through military means and actions that occur in a diplomatic and economic gray zone. This may compel Taiwan to seek increased support from Washington to secure the island. As tensions rise between China and Taiwan, the Biden Administration faces a growing body within the U.S. Congress that is less risk-averse to changing the status quo. Having a DPP President might embolden this body of legislators to continue efforts that are posing challenges to maintaining the status quo, including introducing a historic number of bills that emphasize decoupling from China while intensifying ties with Taiwan. The surge in U.S. legislation to counter China, and China’s targeted areas of exploitation in U.S.-Taiwan relations, suggest three policy areas may be decisive for the Biden Administration to manage potential escalations: Determining its desired end-state with China, which is notably absent from the Administration’s security documents; combatting Chinese information operations; and increasing reliance on U.S. Special Operations Forces to address hybrid problem sets brought about by great power competition.
Taiwan’s Presidential Elections and Impacts on U.S. Foreign Policy
President Tsai’s 2020 victory presented China with a pressing dilemma. The PRC’s multifaceted campaigns to dissuade voters from electing President Tsai into office, which ranged from influence campaigns to mobilize China-friendly factions in Taiwan, to launching millions of cyber attacks against Taiwanese infrastructure each month, ultimately failed, as the island reelected one of its most pro-Western governments since becoming a democracy in 1987. The DPP securing another presidential term in 2024 would present the PRC with a repeat national security dilemma that may invoke a reevaluation of its Taiwan policy. With President Xi’s increasingly threatening posture towards Taiwan, a Chinese recalibration may place more weight on military operations and irregular tactics that would complicate the way Taiwanese and American decision makers can detect and respond to both immediate and enduring problem sets. For Washington’s part, overt provocations against Taiwan may force a more direct U.S. response, as several recent foreign policy debackles have put the U.S. commitment to allies and partners into question and has damaged the effectiveness of several U.S. deterrence tools, not the least of which includes the ability of the executive and legislative branches to function quickly and cooperatively. In the near term, the Biden Administration and the defense apparatus must assess which responses may be required from the U.S. to demonstrate commitment to Taiwan while being a steward of cross-strait diplomacy, and by way, how that might be impacted by Congress.
President Xi may have positive prospects in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan’s elections, which will be held concurrent to the Presidential race. The Legislative Yuan is the unicameral legislature of Taiwan, and currently, the DPP holds the majority. However, based on performance in Taiwan’s November 2022 local elections, which saw a historic DPP loss, the DPP is at risk of losing its majority in the legislative chamber to the KMT. If the DPP wins the Presidential race, then Taiwan would be under a split government, whereby the executive branch would hold more antagonistic views of the PRC, while the legislative branch would seek dialogue and cooperation with the mainland. For the KMT, stronger relations with China offers greater prospects for peace, which would present the DPP President, who is likely be the current Vice President, Lai Ching-te, with a potential running mate as the current de facto ambassador to the U.S., Bi-khim Hsiao, with serious hurdles to executing national and foreign policy objectives. Under this split, China may exploit the Legislative Yuan in an effort to block the DPP’s agenda.
A DPP President seeking increased support from the U.S. would present the Biden Administration with a dilemma. The United States Congress has always played an intimate role in shaping the U.S.-Sino policy, and as the Administration encountered with former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August of 2022, Congress’ views and execution of foreign relations with China can differ from that of the Administration’s. The past several U.S. Congress’ have seen a historic number of legislation to decouple from China, increase military cooperation with Taiwan, bolster U.S. military presence in the Indo-Pacific, and build a coalition of partners based on a “democracy versus autocracy” framework. A recent study on the narrative of U.S. congressional policy towards China found two important trends from the 115th through the 117th Congress. First, China-related bills in the 117th Congress emphasized values and ideologies more than the past two congresses. And second, the U.S. Congress has been systematically striving for decoupling policies on economic, technological, cultural, and academic fronts with China. Notably, this was irrespective of an “America First” presidency during the Trump Administration, or a “multilateralist” presidency during the Biden Administration.
These findings suggest that the 118th Congress under a renewed DPP presidency and a potentially more coercive China may not just continue to expand competition with China, and cooperation with Taiwan, but that these efforts might be conducted with greater urgency and sense of moral obligation. Like the Cold War, framing competition around ideologies draws in the whole-of-nation and risks hubris in light of strategy. Unlike the Cold War, today’s media allows the U.S. and the PRC to disseminate an ideological competition to nearly every citizen, and every country, in the matter of seconds.
China’s Areas of Exploitation in U.S.-Taiwan Relations
The PRC’s methods to compete with the U.S. militarily, economically, and politically have expanded over the last two decades and teeter between overt hostility, and peaceful friction. Arguably the most problematic for the United States and Taiwan is China’s use of irregular warfare, which some U.S. government officials also describe as hybrid warfare, gray zone activity, and asymmetric conflict. The use of irregular warfare (IW) has allowed China to conduct operations below the threshold of armed conflict in order to build legitimacy and influence in a balance-of-power competition, and can range from cyber operations, influence campaigns, and economic coercion, and are often backed by conventional capabilities. Within the past decade, the RAND Corporation found China to have employed nearly 80 different gray zone tactics in the Indo-Pacific. There are several advantages that China receives from using irregular tactics: investing in an IW campaign is less costly than investing in conventional capabilities, and in several cases can be employed more quickly; IW can mobilize foreign groups towards a common goal with the PRC; IWcampaigns offer a degree of anonymity; and, to China’s great advantage, the use of IW can restrict U.S. policymakers from acting quickly and decisively, as permitted under U.S. law, to deter and defeat malign PRC campaigns. There are also several disadvantages of IW that can have grave consequences for both China and the U.S., one of the more notable being a high degree of improbability with operations in the information environment. Even with a sophisticated understanding of a population, there is no guarantee that a message will be received as intended, and the second- and third-hand effects might lead to a more fervent struggle for legitimacy and influence between states.
China’s military employs a unique irregular warfare approach that is embodied within its three warfares (三战) concept: psychological warfare; media warfare; and legal warfare. These are so tightly interwoven with China’s conventional capabilities that the term “irregular warfare” is used sparingly in Chinese texts, as the three warfares are so central to the PRC’s approach that they are not considered “irregular.”, Taken together, three warfares help the PRC achieve several objectives: deter adversarial military operations; propagate regional or international positive messages about the PRC while sowing discontent about other governments, ideologies, or movements; and create, and justify, advantageous operational spaces using domestic law. Within each pillar exists a wide range of PRC gray zone tactics, which might be carried out by several different components, including private military companies.
China has sought greater utilization of information dominance (制信息权) to create advantages in important conventional domains, including the sea and air. President Xi has pursued this advantage both overtly, including the People Liberation Army’s incursions into Taiwan air defense identification zone to deter the United States from defending the island, to covert operations, including cultivating foreign agents to garner political leverage. The 2021 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community determined that “Beijing has been intensifying efforts to shape the political environment in the United States to promote its policy preferences, mold public discourse, pressure political figures whom Beijing believes oppose its interests, and muffle criticism of China on such issues as religious freedom and the suppression of democracy in Hong Kong.” Should the DPP secure another presidential term, China would continue a sophisticated deployment of information warfare, to include psychological operations, electronic warfare, and cyber warfare, to disrupt growing U.S.-Taiwan relations, rally pro-China factions in both Taiwan and the U.S., and spread positive messaging about unification with Taiwan.
Clarity and Demand-Signaling
The past two U.S. administrations have invested heavily in counter-PRC strategies, though never truly settled and invested in a desired end-state with China. The Biden Administration’s China policies are mostly concentrated around short- and mid-term competition with the PRC, and lack an eye towards an end-state. For example, does America want to coexist with, contain, or end the Chinese Communist Party? As the Soviet Union exemplified, the collapse of one regime could birth an equally-challenging adversary. Conversely, seeking “peaceful coexistence” with a revisionist competitor is neither durable nor compatible with spreading liberal democracy. Without articulating a desired end-state, the U.S. Congress lacks clear guidance on U.S.-Sino relations and becomes susceptible to pursuing fractured policies that are incompatible with a long-term strategy. Congress tends to articulate a strategy that is “tough on China.” The Administration needs to articulate a strategy that is “smart on China.”
The U.S.-Sino relationship, on one hand, provides unmatched opportunities to achieve U.S. national interests, including China offering the largest export market for U.S. goods and services, and rich research collaboration that has benefited U.S. health, technology, and space sectors. On the other hand, China has the power to challenge America’s economic and innovative base, democratic norms, and alliances and partnerships through actions such as intellectual property theft, dominating supply chains, currency manipulation, disinformation campaigns, and creating regional spheres of influence. As the U.S. both competes and cooperates with China, an end-state must account for the delicacy of these interactions, consider short- and intermediate-goals that support the long-term health of the nation, span and integrate all components of national power, and craft the right domestic and foreign partnerships to be effective. While the U.S. has relevant experience creating a long-term strategy with a robust competitor during the Cold War, complex linkages with China present the U.S. with a novel and more consequential challenge. Although some might attribute the lack of clarity to strategic ambiguity, that is utilized for short-term deterrence initiatives (how the U.S. will support Taiwan, should China invade), not a long-term strategy (how the U.S. will forge enduring relations with a nation that is an engine for achieving U.S. national priorities).
Should cross-strait relations deter with a 2024 DPP win and invoke responses from Congress that are urgent and ideologically-scoped, the Administration must provide policy guardrails. Doing so helps the legislative branch align with the executive branch on managing escalations that risk the long-term health of U.S. national security. A desired end state might include several objectives that could receive bipartisan support from Congress, and would be in line with the Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific priorities. First, an end-state might include disabling the PRC from achieving imperial ambitions through coercion, military aggression, nuclear threats, or regional spheres of influence. This could focus on a myriad of interest areas that present themselves as less threatening to the PRC, such as building the U.S. industrial base. Second, assisting U.S. allies and partners in denying a PRC attempt to undermine their autonomy would help increase stability in the Indo-Pacific, create operational tempo with indigenous forces, and help manage U.S. resources by building partner force capacity. And third, both the Administration and Congress could strive for an end-state that renders an earnest partner of the PRC to tackle mutual global interests, such as space exploration. Doing so could help frame current congressional legislation around long-term benefits for U.S. national interests.
Controlling the Narrative
A first step in the PRC’s invasion strategy might focus on operations in the information environment. This could occur below the threat threshold and over the course of several months, with some Members of Congress contending the U.S. is already amid China’s invasion strategy. The intent would be to create an advantageous environment for the PRC to allow for a more swift and decisive victory over the island, which might include spreading narratives to fracture both Taiwanese and American decision-makers, sow distrust between people and governments, isolate Taiwan diplomatically, and give a sense that the island is unable to defend itself.
The United States has always faced serious issues with how it uses information for national security. Department of Defense documents tend to highlight information operations, political warfare, and public diplomacy as the chief roles of information to achieve a military objective, though they are often interpreted differently across various agencies, from the combatant commands to the individual services., Loosely, these three conceptualizations of information define the way information is used to achieve a commander’s objectives in conjunction with kinetic activities; to achieve a military objective using strictly non-kinetic means; and to shape narratives about the United States, respectively. They are also considered the primary function of information, depending on which agency is leading it and the desired objectives. The fractured interpretation and utilization of information has resulted in an inability for the interagency to cohesively integrate information as a tool of national power to achieve desired objectives. More importantly, it creates an opportunity for China to exploit these gaps in a way that creates favorable operational environments. Under a divided government where the executive and legislative branches hold differing perspectives on how to counter Chinese information campaigns, the inability of the U.S. to control narratives in the information space could prove decisive for a PRC invasion.
The challenges that the United States government faced to deescalate domestic tensions over the past two administrations has demonstrated to the PRC the profitability of using strategic messaging to halt or paralyze a government, or bring an entire society to heel. The Russian Federation has already taken advantage of this through various campaigns to influence U.S. presidential races, inflame domestic grievances, and spread pro-Russian propaganda among American citizens. In a plight to manage cross-strait tensions, the United States’ struggles to combat information warfare would be compounded by Taiwan’s own challenges to counter daily information warfare campaigns from the PRC, including consistent incursions from Chinese spies into Taiwan’s intelligence community, Taiwan’s weak espionage laws that make it easier for the Chinese to elicit information from government officials, and limited resources dedicated to reviewing the accuracy of information shared in the media. If tensions escalate between Taiwan and China, the Administration must be able to control the information space to maintain a focused and united front against potential PRC gains. This would require a new emphasis on improving how the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) trains, mans, and equips for operations in the information environment. Several amendments in the past few National Defense Authorization Acts have attempted to address this, though the DoD and the Administration must play a more active role in educating and informing policymakers on means to consolidate information operations.
Increasing Reliance on U.S. Special Operations Forces
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are arguably the best equipped to tackle a multidomain, hybrid contingency over Taiwan. The Department of Defense has long utilized SOF for their specialization in unconventional warfare, an ability to maintain a low profile while operating deftly in politically-sensitive and nuanced environments, and their knack for developing local infrastructure that could be used to hedge against adversaries. U.S. SOF spend significant time training and developing partner forces before combat occurs, which is needed in the Indo-Pacific as China continues an enduring campaign to create military, political, and economic advantages that would support an invasion strategy. The success of Ukrainian SOF on the battlefield has been attributed by some to the U.S. Army’s Special Forces engagement strategy with Ukrainian partners in the preceding eight years before Russia’s February 2022 invasion. Should the DPP secure a 2024 victory and tensions rise between the island and the mainland, the Biden Administration should increase its utilization of U.S. SOF to help manage escalations, increase options for decision-makers, mitigate gains made from systematic pressures against the island, and build operational tempo with Taiwanese partners to enable a more seamless integration of resources.
While SOF have made a presence on and off Taiwan throughout the years in limited numbers, that is nowhere near sufficient to meet Taiwan’s readiness needs. America’s conventional units operate similarly in and around the island, and a lack of enduring presence will complicate efforts to prepare Taiwan’s forces for provocations or an invasion. While the Administration and the Defense Department must evaluate the degree to which it is appropriate to have an enduring presence of SOF, some presence demonstrates genuine U.S. commitment to protecting Taiwan while tackling the irregular warfare issue, something China must understand if their government is to properly calculate the risk of invasion. This would also offer a reasonable middleground between policymakers who express interest in an overt military presence in China’s backyard, with the U.S. State Department’s advocacy for a more tempered, diplomatic presence that deftly assesses the risk of a provocative response from the PRC.
Alternative Focus Areas
Certainly, there are several other key areas in the U.S.-Sino-Taiwan relationship that would prove critical to maintaining and protecting U.S. national security interests should tensions rise under a DPP leadership. The White House’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy points to three additional core problem sets: nuclear, supply chains, and regional spheres of influence. The most pressing of which might be the nuclear question. China’s impressive build up of its nuclear capabilities over the past decade has caught Congress’ attention and has invoked the introduction of several bills that seek to stunt China’s nuclear growth while expanding that of the United States. Should the DPP secure the 2024 election and prompt a recalibration of Congress’ Indo-Pacific nuclear posture, it begs the question of whether President Xi would consider nuclear escalation in response. There is also the supply chain resiliency question. Several Members of Congress contend this should be the chief focus in the U.S.-Sino competition due to America’s supply chain dependency on China and the risks of material shortages that are critical for national security and economic prosperity, including semiconductors. And lastly, though not comprehensively, some might also point to the need for the Biden Administration and the defense apparatus to focus on China’s continued efforts to create a regional sphere of influence. President Xi’s ability to amass influence in the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility and strategically place itself in advantageous locations offers an ability to isolate Taiwan and deter the U.S. from coming to Taiwan’s aid. It also offers the PRC with an ability to exercise greater control over operations within and surrounding the Indo-Pacific, including maritime trade and limiting adversarial military strike range.
While addressing these additional core problems would improve the U.S. posture towards China, none offer quick solutions, nor solutions that offer a decreased risk of eliciting a stark response from the mainland. Addressing China’s nuclear capabilities would require diplomatic finessing to summon the Chinese to an agreement on nuclear rules and regulations, similar to the New START treaty that the U.S. had with Russia. The Chinese have noted time and again that Beijing is in its nuclear infancy, and the country is not prepared nor willing to restrict the growth of their arsenal. Alternatively, the risk of a nuclear buildup with China might ensue if the U.S. were to try to counter the PRC’s nuclear weapons program by modernizing its own stockpile or by moving nuclear weapons closer to the strait. Then, the supply chain question is one of longevity. Members of Congress have likewise paid increased attention to identifying and addressing supply chain issues, though this will require significant time and resourcing well past the Biden Administration’s time. While the Administration and Congress might coordinate efforts to locate supply chain vulnerabilities, the results would not be felt in the immediate term and subsequently would not be consequential enough should tensions rise over the next four years. And lastly, countering a regional sphere of influence will additionally consume much time and resources, and is inherently ideological and requires a military presence to some degree. This likewise risks invoking a stark response from the mainland under already alert conditions and divided branches of government.
Conclusion
The result of Taiwan’s presidential elections have the potential to create a highly contentious relationship with the People’s Republic of China, and subsequently alter the United States cross-strait policy. If the DPP wins the 2024 presidential election and continues to favor eventual independence and closer relations with the U.S., China’s President Xi Jinping might recalibrate its Taiwan policy, including through military means and the use of irregular warfare. Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress is posing challenges to maintaining the status quo, including introducing a historic number of bills that emphasize decoupling from China while intensifying ties with Taiwan. If the Biden Administration wants to maintain the status quo and manage regional escalations, it must calculate how Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential election will impact U.S. policy for cross-strait relations. Based on China’s utilization of irregular warfare tactics, and major themes drawn from recent Congressional legislation, the Biden Administration should adjust its approach to maintaining the status quo and preventing a contingency over Taiwan by focusing on three areas: Determining its desired end-state with China to align efforts across the federal government towards achieving those objectives; combatting Chinese information operations; and increasing reliance on U.S. Special Operations Forces to address hybrid problem sets posed by great power competition.
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